We study the classic problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous resource ("cake") among several agents with different preferences. In our setting, the resource is already divided among several "old" agents. When "young" agents come, the resource should be re-divided in a way that is fair both for the young and for the old agents. Motivated by land redivision and other two-dimensional division problems, we assume that the cake is a rectilinear polygon and require that the allotted pieces be rectangles. Our re-division protocol has an implication on another problem: the price-of-fairness -the loss of social welfare caused by fairness requirements. Our protocol allows us to prove upper bounds on the price-of-fairness in two-dimensional cake-cutting with rectangular pieces. Our protocol also handles the more general case in which the cake is convex and the pieces can be arbitrary convex figures.
INTRODUCTION
Fair division of land and other resources among agents with different preferences has been an important issue since Biblical times. Today it is an active area of research in the interface of computer science [Procaccia 2015; Robertson and Webb 1998 ] and economics [Moulin 2004 ]. Its applications range from politics [Brams 2007; Brams and Taylor 1996 ] to multi-agent systems [Chevaleyre et al. 2006 ].
The classic setting assumes a one-shot division: the resource is divided once and for all, like a cake that is divided and eaten. But in practice, it is often required to re-divide an already-divided resource. One example is a cloud-computing environment, where new agents often come and require resources already held by other agents. A second example is fair allocation of radio spectrum among several broadcasting agencies: it may be required to re-divide the frequencies to accommodate new broadcasters. A third example is land-reform: large land-estates are held by a small number of landlords, and the government may want to re-divide them among landless citizens.
In the classic one-shot division setting, all agents have equal rights and the goal is to give each agent a fair share of the cake. The common definition of a "fair share" is a piece worth at least 1/n of the total cake value, according to the agent's personal valuation function. This fairness requirement is usually termed proportionality.
In contrast, in the re-division setting it may be required to give extra rights to the "old" agents -the agents currently holding pieces of the cake. In particular, it may be required to give each old agent the opportunity to keep a substantial share of its currently-held piece. This may be due either to efficiency reasons (in the cloud computing scenario) or economic reasons (in the radio spectrum scenario) or political reasons (in the land-reform scenario). Ideally, if the number of old agents is m and the total number of agents (old+young) is n, we would like to let each old agent keep a fraction of its current piece with a value of at least m/n its current value, so that the decrease in value is proportional to the increase in population. We refer to this fairness requirement as retention.
While most cake-cutting papers assume that the cake is a 1-dimensional interval, we handle the more realistic scenario of a 2-dimensional cake. Moreover, we require that the piece given to each agent be rectangular. Rectangularity requirement is sensible when dividing land, exhibition space in museums, advertisement space in newspapers and even virtual space in web-pages. Moreover, in the frequency-range allocation problem, it is possible to allocate frequency ranges for a limited time-period; the frequencytime space is two-dimensional and it makes sense to require that the "pieces" are rectangles in this space [Iyer and Huhns 2009] . In Sub. 7.1 we show that our protocol can also handle a convexity requirement. 2-dimensional cake-cutting introduces new challenges over the traditional 1-dimensional setting; see Sub. 1.4.
The three goals of proportionality, retention and geometry may be impossible to satisfy simultaneously. We therefore relax the fairness requirements. Following previous cake-cutting papers (see Subsection 2.1), we require partial proportionality, which means that each agent receives at least 1/(A · n) of the total, where A > 1 is a constant independent of n. Similarly, instead of retention we require partial retention. In the following subsections we formalize these concepts and present our solutions.
Cake-cutting
The cake C is a polygon in the Euclidean plane R 2 . In the main body of the paper, the pieces have to be rectangular, so we assume that C is rectilinear (aka orthogonal), i.e, each angle is either 90 • or 270 • . Rectilinearity is a common assumption in polygon partition problems [Keil 2000 ]. Our bounds depend on the complexity of the cake, which can be quantified by the number of its reflex vertexes (vertexes with a 270 • angle). We denote the cake complexity by R. When C is a rectangle -the simplest rectilinear polygon -it has R = 0. The cake at the right has R = 4 reflex vertexes (circled). For the moment, ignore the diamond-shaped areas; they are explained later.
C has to be divided among n ≥ 1 agents. Each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} has a value-density function v i , which is an integrable, non-negative and bounded function on C. The value of a piece X to agent i is marked by V i (X) and it is the integral of its value-density:
The V i are measures and are absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, i.e., any piece with zero area has zero value to all agents. Therefore, we do not need to worry about who gets the boundary of a piece, since its value is 0.
The agents' valuations are their private information. A division protocol accesses the agents' valuations via queries. Standard cake-cutting protocols use two types of queries [Robertson and Webb 1998 ]: an eval query asks an agent to reveal its value for a specified piece of cake; a mark query asks an agent to mark a piece of cake with a specified value. As usual in the cake-cutting literature since Steinhaus [1948] , the fairness guarantees of our division protocols are valid for every agent answering the queries truthfully, regardless of the behavior of the other agents. However, our protocols are not dominant-strategy-truthful, i.e, an agent may gain by answering untruthfully. Designing dominant-strategy-truthful mechanisms for cake-cutting is known to be a difficult problem even in one dimension, see e.g. [Chen et al. 2013] . Hence, in the present paper we ignore strategic considerations and assume agents answer truthfully.
An allocation is a vector of n pieces, X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ), one piece per agent, such that the X i are pairwise-disjoint and ∪ n i=1 X i ⊆ C. Note that some cake may remain unallocated, i.e, free disposal is assumed. We explain in Sub. 1.4 why this is important. An allocation is proportional if every agent receives at least 1/n of the total cake value:
n For a constant A ≥ 1, an allocation is called (1/A)-proportional if every agent receives at least a fraction 1/(An) of the total cake value, according to its personal valuation:
An allocation X is called rectangular, if for every i, X i is a rectangle. In this paper we are interested only in rectangular allocations in which the sides of the rectangles are parallel to the sides of C. In Sub. 7.1 we discuss how our results can be extended to other geometric constraints, such as convexity, connectivity and bounded aspect ratio.
Redivision
In the redivision problem, the n agents are divided to two groups: m agents (indexed 1, . . . , m) are called old and the other n − m agents (indexed m + 1, . . . , n) are called young. There is an existing allocation of the cake C to the m old agents: C 1 , . . . , C m . It is assumed that the old pieces C i are pairwise-disjoint and rectangular. Other than that, nothing is assumed on the division. In particular, we do not assume that the original division is fair or that all of C is divided.
It is required to create a new allocation of C to all agents: X 1 , . . . , X n . We would like to give each old agent a subset of its previous piece. Moreover, we would like this subset to be sufficiently valuable. Ideally, we would like all old agents to receive at least m n of their old value, so that the decrease in value is proportional to the increase in population. Hence, we say that the allocation X satisfies the retention property, if:
Similarly to partial-proportionality, for a given constant B ≥ 1 independent of m, n, we would like to say that an allocation has (1/B)-retention if:
Unfortunately, partial-retention according to the above definition cannot always be satisfied together with partialproportionality. An example is illustrated at the right. The square is C 1 -the old piece allocated to the old agent #1. The value density of that agent, v 1 , is uniform over C 1 . There are m = h 2 old agents and n − m = h 2 young agents, for some parameter h (in the figure h = 5). Each young agent has a positive value-measure only in a very specific location, marked by a diamond-shape inside C 1 . If #1 receives a rectangle that covers a diamond-shape, the young agent that wants this diamond will have a value of 0. Hence, partial-proportionality requires to give #1 a rectangle that does not cover any diamond. Such a rectangle has an area of at most 1/h the total area of C 1 , so the new value of agent #1 is at most 1/ √ m its current value. This does not equal m B·n for any constant B. This bad example is based on the assumption that many young agents want a piece inside the allocation of the same old agent. This hints that, by the pigeonhole principle, such misfortune will happen to only a small number of old agents; most old agents will still be able to keep a decent fraction of their old value. Based on this observation, we present a relaxed definition of the partial-retention property. Our definition is inspired by the "90th percentile" criterion common in Service-Level-Agreements and Qualityof-Service analysis, e.g. [Delimitrou and Kozyrakis 2014; Zhang et al. 2014] . We would like to guarantee 90% of the old agents, a certain fraction of m/n of their old value; guarantee 80% of the old agents an even larger fraction of m/n of their old value; etc.
Moreover, since the retention property is intended to help old agents and not harm them, we would like to allow each old agent to choose between the guarantee of the retention property and the guarantee of the partial-proportionality property. Therefore, if the value guarantee provided to an old agent by partial-retention is smaller than the value guarantee provided to that agent by partial-proportionality, then the agent receives the partial-proportionality guarantee.
Formally, our partial-retention property is defined as follows. For every integer k ∈ {1, . . . , m}, at least m − k old agents receive the best out of two options: (a) a subset of their previously-owned piece with a value of more than k n+k of their previous value; (b) a piece with a value of at least 1/(An), where A is the partial-proportionality constant of the protocol. I.e, for every k ∈ {1, . . . , m}, there are at least m − k indexes j ∈ {1, . . . , m} for which:
Substituting appropriate values of k yields that, for example, -at least 90% of the old agents receive more than m/(11n) of their old value (k = m/10), -at least 75% of the old agents receive more than m/(5n) of their old value (k = m/4), -at least half of the old agents receive more than m/(3n) of their old value (k = m/2).
Social Welfare and Price of Fairness
In addition to fairness, it is often required that a division has a high social welfare. The social welfare of an allocation is a certain aggregate function of the normalized values of the agents (the normalized value is the piece value divided by the total cake value). The three common social welfare functions are egalitarian, utilitarian and Nash [Moulin 2004 ]. We normalize them such that the maximum welfare is 1:
-Egalitarian welfare -the minimum of the agents' normalized values:
-Utilitarian welfare -the arithmetic mean of the agents' normalized values:
-Nash welfare -the geometric mean of the agents' normalized values:
The goal of maximizing the social welfare is not always compatible with the goal of guaranteeing a fair share to every agent. For example, Caragiannis et al. [2012] describe a simple example in which the maximum utilitarian welfare of a proportional allocation is O(1/n) while the maximum utilitarian welfare of an arbitrary (unfair)
. This means that society has to pay a price, in terms of socialwelfare, for insisting on fairness. This is called the price of fairness. Formally, given a social welfare function W and a fairness criterion F , the price-of-fairness relative to W and F (also called: "the W -price-of-F ") is the ratio:
where the maximum at the nominator is over all allocations X and the maximum at the denominator is over all allocations Y that also satisfy the fairness criterion F . The cited example shows that the utilitarian-price-of-proportionality might be Ω( √ n). When the allocation is required to be rectangular, both maxima are taken only on rectangular allocations. The price-of-fairness may be either higher or lower than with arbitrary pieces, so both upper bounds and lower bounds have to be re-calculated.
The challenges in two-dimensional cake-cutting
Most cake-cutting papers, especially in computer science, assume that the cake is the unit interval [0,1] and the pieces are its sub-intervals. It is often claimed [Woodall 1980 ] that this assumption is without loss of generality, since 2-dimensional division can be reduced to 1dimensional division by projecting the cake on the unit interval and projecting the resulting division back on the original cake. Indeed, projecting a connected division of a 1-dimensional interval on a rectangular cake yields a 2dimensional division with rectangular pieces (see illustration at the right). However, when social welfare is concerned, the 1-dimension assumption loses generality:
(a) The reduction to a one-dimensional division might miss the optimal division. For example, suppose the cake is as the one illustrated at the right. There are 4 agents and each agent i has positive value-density only inside C i . The socially-optimal division, according to any definition, is to give each C i entirely to agent i. However, this division cannot be attained by reduction to one dimension.
(b) In two dimensions, the optimal division might require to leave some of the cake unallocated. In the abovementioned cake, any socially-optimal division that gives each agent a rectangle must leave an unallocated space in the middle of C. This counter-intuitive scenario cannot happen in a one-dimensional cake.
Due to such reasons, two-dimensional cake-cutting requires brand new techniques. For example, because we cannot assume that the entire cake is allocated, we must use a special allocation-completion step before our main redivision protocol (see Subsection 1.6). The habit of assuming a one-dimensional cake might cause authors to miss such interesting steps. One goal of the present paper is to encourage authors to use a more general cake-model, like the model offered in Subsection 1.1 or a similar one.
Results
The first contribution of this paper is a protocol for re-division of a rectilinear cake to rectangular pieces. Its guarantees are: -Partial proportionality: Every agent, whether old or young, receives a piece with a value of more than 1 4n+R of the total cake value, where R is the number of reflex vertexes of C. Particularly, when the cake is a rectangle, R = 0 and the allocation is (1/4)-proportional.
-Partial retention: For every integer k ∈ {1, . . . , m}, at least m − k old agents receive the best of the following two options: (a) a subset of their previously-owned piece with a value of more than k n+k of their previous value; (b) a piece with a value of more than 1 4n+R of the total cake value. Our proportionality guarantees depend on R. This dependence is inevitable. Consider the cake at Subsection 1.1, having R = 4 reflex vertexes. There are no old agents and a single young agent, whose value-density is positive only inside the R+1 diamondshaped areas. Any rectangle in C contains at most one diamond; hence the agent can get at most 1 R+1 of the total cake value. The redivision protocol is used to produce the second contribution of this paper: two upper bounds on the price-of-partial-proportionality. For simplicity we present bounds for rectangular cakes. We prove that for every B ≥ 4:
Note that the egalitarian price of (1/B)-proportionality is 1 for all B ≥ 1 whenever a (1/B)-proportional allocation exists. Let W be the optimal egalitarian welfare in the denominator of (*). Then, since the maximization is on (1/B)-proportional allocations, W ≥ 1/(Bn). Since the optimal egalitarian welfare is at least W , the egalitarianoptimal allocation is also (1/B)-proportional. Hence, the optimal egalitarian welfare in the nominator of (*) must also be W .
Our upper bounds use the redivision protocol. In fact, the original motivation for developing the redivision protocol was to prove upper bounds on price-of-fairness (this is why we insist that our redivision protocol does not assume that the old division is fair or that all C is divided). Hence, our upper bounds are constructive: their proofs can be used to convert any existing unfair division to a fair division such that the reduction in social welfare is upper-bounded. In particular, they can be used to convert any socially-optimal division which is not proportional, to a (1/4)-proportional division in which the social welfare approximates the optimal welfare by the given factor.
When the rectangularity constraint is replaced with a convexity constraint (the cake and the pieces are convex), the same results are true with "4" replaced by "5".
Techniques
Dividing a two-dimensional cake requires techniques from two different fields: combinatorics and computational geometry. Our redivision protocol uses two algorithmic building-blocks -the first is combinatorial and the second is geometric.
Block #1 is a multi-cake cutting protocol. It can be used to fairly divide an archipelago of islands among several agents such that each agent receives a piece entirely contained within a single island. It is presented in Section 3.
Block #2 is an allocation-completion algorithm. It takes an allocation of a part of the cake and returns an allocation of the entire cake. It is presented in Section 4.
The main redivision protocol uses Block #2 to convert the old allocation (which may be a partial allocation) to an intermediate allocation of the entire cake. Then, each rectangle in the intermediate allocation is treated as an island, and Block #1 is used to divide the resulting archipelago among the agents. Because each piece is entirely contained within one of the islands, it is possible to use the pigeonhole principle to conclude that a large number of the islands have a small population. This implies that a large number of the old agents can retain a large fraction of their old piece.
The main protocol is presented in Section 5. In Section 6 we use the re-division protocol to prove upper bounds on the price-of-fairness. In Section 7 we discuss some alternative geometric constraints and plans for future work.
RELATED WORK

Partial proportionality
While proportionality is the most common criterion of fair cake-cutting, it is often relaxed to partial-proportionality in order to achieve additional goals, such as:
(1) Speed: finding a proportional division takes Θ(n log n) queries, but finding a (1/A)proportional division takes only Θ(n) queries, for some sufficiently large A ≥ 10 [Edmonds and Pruhs 2006; Edmonds et al. 2008 ].
(2) Improving the social welfare: proportional allocations may be socially inefficient, but it is possible to achieve more socially-efficient allocations by decreasing the value-guarantee per agent [Arzi 2012; Zivan 2011 ].
(3) Guaranteeing a minimum-size constraint. Caragiannis et al. [2011] prove that it is impossible to guarantee a (1/A)-proportional allocation for any finite A, and provide additive approximation algorithms. (4) Satisfying geometric constraints like square pieces [Segal-Halevi et al. 2015a,b] .
For example, when the cake is square and the pieces must be square, it is impossible to guarantee a (1/A)-proportional allocation for any A ≤ 2, but there is an algorithm that guarantees a 1/4-proportional allocation.
Since geometric constraints are central in our setting, it makes sense to adopt partialproportionality as the fairness criterion.
Dynamic fair division
Our cake redivision problem differs from several division problems studied recently. 1. Dynamic resource allocation [Friedman et al. 2015; Kash et al. 2013 ] is a common problem in cloud-computing environments. The server has several resources, such as memory and disk-space. Agents (processes) come and depart. The server has to allocate the resources fairly among agents. When new agents come, the server may have to take some resources from existing agents. The goal is to do the re-allocation with minimal disruption to existing agents [Friedman et al. 2015] . In this problem, the resources are homogeneous, which means that the only thing that matters is what quantity of each resource is given to each agent. In contrast, our cake is heterogeneous and different agents may have different valuations on it, so our protocol must decide which parts of the cake should be given to which agent.
2. Population monotonicity [Moulin 1990 [Moulin , 2004 Thomson 1983 Thomson , 2011 is an axiom that describes a desired property of allocation rules. When new agents arrive and the same division rule is re-activated, the value of all old agents should be weakly smaller than before. This axiom represents the virtue of solidarity: if sacrifices have to be made to support an additional agent, then everybody should contribute [Thomson 1983 ]. We, too, assume that old agents are taking part in supporting the new agents. However, we add the retention requirement, which means that old agents should be allowed to keep at least some of their previous allocation. In addition, while their approach is axiomatic and mainly interested in existence results, our approach is constructive and our goal is to provide an actual re-division protocol.
3. Private endowment, in economics resource allocation problems, means that each agent is endowed with a certain initial bundle of resources. Then, agents exchange resources using a certain market mechanism. The classic problem in economics involves homogeneous resources, but it has also been studied in the cake-cutting framework [Aziz and Ye 2014; Berliant and Dunz 2004] . A basic requirement in these works is individual rationality, which means that the final value allocated to each agent must be weakly larger than the value of the initial endowment (note the contrast with the population monotonicity axiom). In our problem we do not make this assumption as it is incompatible with fairness: since the young agents come with no initial endowment, individual rationality would mean that they will not receive anything in the exchange.
4. Online cake-cutting [Walsh 2011 ] is characteristic of a birthday party in an office, in which some agents come or leave early while others come or leave late. It is required to give some cake to agents who come early while keeping a fair share to those who come late. In contrast to our model, there it is impossible to re-divide allocated pieces, since they are eaten by their receivers. The fairness guarantees are inevitably weaker.
5. Land reform, the re-division of land among citizens, has been attempted in numerous countries around the globe and in many periods throughout history, from ancient Egypt in the times of King Bakenranef (8th century BC) to modern-day Scotland (21st century AD). Fairness is a major concern in such reforms. Many books have been written on this topic, e.g. [Bernstein 2002; Lipton 2009; Powelson 1988; Rosset et al. 2006 ].
Geometric cake models
The most prominent cake-model is a one-dimensional interval, in which case the pieces are often required to be contiguous sub-intervals. This is especially true in computer science papers. Some exceptions (mostly from other disciplines) are: -The cake is a 1-dimensional circle and the pieces are contiguous arcs [Barbanel et al. 2009; Brams et al. 2008 ; Thomson 2007 ]. -The cake is a 2-dimensional territory that lies among several countries. Each country should receive a piece adjacent to its border [Beck 1987; Hill 1983 ]. -The cake is 2-dimensional and the pieces are rectangles whose dimensions can be determined by the agents [Iyer and Huhns 2009 ]. -The cake is 2-dimensional and the pieces must be squares or fat polygons [Segal-Halevi et al. 2015a,b ]. -The cake is 2-dimensional; the geometric constraints are connectivity, simpleconnectivity or convexity [Devulapalli 2014 ]. -The cake is multi-dimensional and the pieces should be simplexes or polytopes [Berliant et al. 1992; Dall'Aglio and Maccheroni 2009; Ichiishi and Idzik 1999] .
Many natural 2-dimensional settings have not been studied yet. One of them is the setting studied here -the cake is a rectilinear polygon and the pieces are rectangles.
Price of fairness
The price-of-fairness in cake-cutting has been studied in two different settings:
-The cake is a one-dimensional interval and the pieces must be intervals. Upper and lower bounds are calculated on the egalitarian and utilitarian prices of proportional-Algorithm 1 Room Partition Algorithm [Culter 2013] INPUT: N = {1, ..., n} (a set of agents) and m (a number of rooms).
For each agent i ∈ N , a set of m non-negative partner-numbers P i,j (with j ∈ {1, . . . , m }) such that Σ m j=1 P i,j ≥ n (in words: for every agent, the sum of the partnersnumbers is at least the total number of agents). OUTPUT: A partitioning of N to m disjoint groups G j (some possibly empty), such that: For every i ∈ N, j ∈ {1, . . . , m }: if i ∈ G j then P i,j ≥ |G j | (in words: for every agent in group j, its partners-number for room j is at least as large as the number of agents in group j). The utilitarian price-of-proportionality in both cases is Θ( √ n); Nash price was not calculated. We are not aware of any bounds on price-of-fairness for two-dimensional (or multi-dimensional) cakes when there is a geometric constraint on the pieces.
MULTI-CAKE CUTTING PROTOCOL
The first building-block in our re-division protocol is a protocol for fairly dividing a set of disjoint cakes. The protocol operates on m disjoint cakes, C 1 , . . . , C m , each of which is a rectangle. They can be thought of as islands; the "archipelago" (the union of all islands) is called C, and C = ∪ m j=1 C j . The protocol should return a rectangular allocation X of the archipelago C among the n agents. X should satisfy the following properties:
-Locality: every agent receives a piece entirely contained within a single island: ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : ∃j ∈ {1, . . . , m } : X i ⊆ C j -Partial proportionality: every agent receives a piece such that:
Below (Example 3.2) we show that this is the largest value that can be guaranteed.
The protocol
Step 1. Normalize the value measures such that ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : V i (C) = n + m − 1. Our goal is now to give each agent a piece with value at least 1.
Step 2. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, issue an eval-query asking agent i to evaluate the island C j .
Step 3. For each i, j, let P i,j = V i (C j ) . P stands for "partners" and represents the maximum number of partners with which agent i can share the island C j (including agent i itself), such that i is still guaranteed a value of at least 1. For example, if an agent values a certain island as 2.4, then its partners-number for that island is 2, 
Agent #1
Agent #2 Agent #3 Agent #4 West V = 0.8 → P = 0 V = 2.4 → P = 2 V = 3.1 → P = 3* V = 4 → P = 4* East V = 4.2 → P = 4* V = 2.6 → P = 2* V = 1.9 → P = 1 V = 1 → P = 1 Total V = 5 ; P = 4 V = 5 ; P = 4 V = 5 ; P = 4 V = 5 ; P > 4 because if the agent shares this island in a group of 2 partners including itself, it is guaranteed a value of at least 1.2, but if it shares the island in a larger group, it is not guaranteed more than 0.8.
Step 4. Note that for all i, because n j=1 V i (C j ) = n + m − 1, also n j=1 P i,j > n − 1 (the agent "loses" less than 1 unit of value per island). Because all numbers are integer, n j=1 P i,j ≥ n. Hence, we can use the Room Partition Algorithm. This algorithm is due to Culter [2013] . Since it was never formally published, we bring it here as Algorithm 1. This is a combinatorial algorithm, which takes as input the partner-numbers P i,j , and returns a partitioning of the agents to m groups G 1 , . . . , G m , such that the number of agents in each group is bounded by the "partners" values of the agents in that group. I.e., for every group j and for every agent i ∈ G j : P i,j ≥ |G j |.
By definition of the P i,j , ∀i, j : V i (C j ) ≥ P i,j . Hence, the Room Partition Algorithm guarantees that for every agent i ∈ G j : V i (C j ) ≥ |G j |.
Step 5. Project the rectangular island C j on an interval, divide it proportionally among the agents in group G j using a one-dimensional protocol such as [Even and Paz 1984] , and project the resulting intervals back onto C j (see Sub. 1.4). Each agent i ∈ G j receives a rectangle X i ⊆ C j with a value of at least V i (C j )/|G j | ≥ 1. Since V i (C) = n + m − 1, the value per agent is at least 1 = V i (C)/(n + m − 1), as required.
Examples
Example 3.1. Table I shows an example with n = 4 agents and m = 2 islands. The total value of the archipelago is m + n − 1 = 5. In each cell, V is the value of that agent to that island and P is the corresponding partners-number. The Room Partition Algorithm sends agents 1 and 2 to the East island and agents 3 and 4 to the West island (marked by an asterisk). All agents value their island as more than 2. Each island is divided between its two agents using a proportional cake-cutting protocol, such as cut-and-choose. Each agent is guaranteed a piece worth at least half the value of the island, which in this case is more than 1.
Example 3.2. The following example shows that the fraction of 1/(n + m − 1), guaranteed by our multi-cake cutting protocol, is the largest that can be guaranteed. Assume that all agents i ∈ {1, . . . , n} have the same value measure:
For all agents, the total value of the archipelago is V i (C) = n + m − 1. The piece of every agent must be entirely contained in a single island. If any agent receives a piece in islands C 1 , . . . , C m −1 , then that agent receives a value of at most 1. Otherwise, if all n agents receive a piece in island C m , then the value of at least one agent is at most 1. In both cases, at least one agent receives a fraction of at most 1/(n + m − 1) of V i (C).
ALLOCATION-COMPLETION ALGORITHM
Our second building-block is an algorithm that converts a partial allocation to a complete allocation. Its input is a rectilinear cake C with R reflex vertexes, and an allocation C 1 , . . . , C m of disjoint rectangles, such that C 1 ∪ · · · ∪ C m ⊆ C. Its output is a new allocation, C 1 , . . . , C m , with m ≥ m, satisfying the following requirements:
-Rectangle-preservation: every input rectangle is contained in an output rectangle:
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , m} : C j ⊆ C j -Completeness: the new allocation is a partition of the entire cake:
Our goal is to use the multi-cake cutting protocol of Section 3 with the complete partition C 1 , . . . , C m . Since the partial-proportionality guarantees of the multi-cake-cutting protocol depend on m , we would like m to be as small as possible, i.e, add as few new rectangles as possible.
A-priori, it seems that a sophisticated algorithm is needed to attain a small m . However, as it turns out, the following simple algorithm attains near-optimal results: -Phase 1: For j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, extend rectangle C j to the maximum extent possible without overlapping the other rectangles. Now, there are m enlarged rectangles and possibly some "holes", each of which is a rectilinear polygon. -Phase 2: Partition each hole to a minimal number of rectangles. This can be done using one of the algorithms surveyed by Keil [2000] [pages 10-13] and Eppstein [2009] [pages 3-5]. -Return the m rectangles from Phase 1 and the rectangles from Phase 2.
To analyze the performance of this algorithm, we have to bound the number of rectangles produced in Phase 2. We recently proved [Segal-Halevi 2016] the following bound:
LEMMA 4.1. If, on a rectilinear polygon with R reflex vertexes, there is an arrangement of m ≥ 2 pairwise-disjoint rectangles, and this arrangement is maximal (no rectangle can be enlarged without overlapping other rectangles), then the number of rectangular parts of all "holes" in the arrangement is at most m + R − 2.
(we also showed that the bound of m + R − 2 is asymptotically tight, since there exists a maximal arrangement with m + R − O( √ m) rectangular holes). Hence, the total number of rectangles in the completed allocation is m < 2m + R.
CAKE REDIVISION PROTOCOL
Our re-division protocol takes as input a group of m old agents. There is a rectilinear cake C and there is an existing allocation to the old agents, such that every agent j ∈ {1, . . . , m} holds a rectangular piece C j . Some cake may be unallocated, i.e, it is possible that C C 1 ∪ · · · ∪ C m . There is a group of n − m young agents that currently hold no cake (n is the new number of agents; n ≥ m). The protocol should re-divide the cake C among the n agents. The allocation X should be rectangular and satisfy the following properties: -Partial proportionality: every agent receives a rectangle worth at least 1/(4n + R) of total cake value:
-Partial retention: for every integer k ≤ m, at least m − k old agents receive the best of the following two options: (a) a rectangular subset of their previously-owned piece with a value of more than k n+k of their previous value; (b) a rectangular piece with a value of at least 1 n+4m+R of the total cake value.
The protocol
First, use the algorithm of Section 4 to convert the existing partial allocation to a full allocation of C with m < 2m + R rectangles. Then, use the multi-cake cutting protocol of Section 3 to divide the pieces C 1 , ..., C m to all n agents, in the following way. For each old agent j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, add a "virtual agent" j * and assign it a value-density
The total number of agents is now n + m, so the valuations are normalized such that ∀i : V i (C) = n + m + m − 1 < n + 3m + R. The multi-cake cutting protocol allocates a piece to each agent. As a final step, we let each old agent j ∈ {1, . . . , m} choose either the piece allocated to its normal agent j or the piece allocated to its virtual agent j * .
Analysis
The final allocation satisfies the partial-proportionality requirement; this follows immediately from the guarantees of the multi-cake cutting protocol of Section 3. The following claim is sufficient to prove that it also satisfies partial-retention.
CLAIM 5.1. For each k ∈ {1, . . . , m}, there are at least m − k virtual agents j * who receive a rectangular subset of C j that is worth for agent j at least k n+k · V j (C j ). PROOF. First, note that the multi-cake cutting protocol must put every virtual agent j * in group G j , since its value is positive only in sub-cake C j .
By the pigeonhole principle, for every integer k ≤ m, at most k of the groups G j have at least n/k normal agents. Hence, there are at least m − k virtual agents j * whose group G j has less than n/k normal agents. Together with the virtual agent itself, the total number of agents in these groups is at most (n/k) + 1 = (n + k)/k. Hence, the cake-cutting protocol of Step #5 gives these virtual agents a rectangular subset of C j worth at least a fraction k n+k of its total value. Therefore, at least m − k old agents have the option to choose a subset of C j worth for them at least k n+k · V j (C j ), as required by the definition of partial-retention.
PRICE-OF-FAIRNESS BOUNDS
In this section, the redivision protocol of Section 5 is used to prove upper bounds on the price of partial-proportionality. Two bounds are proved: one for utilitarian welfare and one for Nash welfare. For simplicity, we focus here on a rectangular cake (R = 0). 6.1. Utilitarian price of partial-proportionality THEOREM 6.1. For every constant B ≥ 4 and for any number n of agents, the utilitarian price of (1/B)-proportionality with rectangularity constraint is O(n 1/2 ).
The theorem is proved by the following: LEMMA 6.1. Assume that there are n agents whose value functions are normalized such that the value of the entire cake C is 1. Assume that there is a division of C among these n agents such that each agent j ∈ {1, . . . , n} holds a rectangular piece C j and the utilitarian welfare is U :
Then, there exists a (1/4)-proportional rectangular allocation of C to these same n agents with utilitarian welfare W , and U/W = O(n 1/2 ).
PROOF. Apply the redivision protocol of Section 5 to the existing division by setting m = n and treating all n agents as "old". The partial-proportionality of that protocol ensures that the new division is 1/4-proportional. The partial-retention of that protocol ensures that for every integer k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, there is a set S k containing at least n − k agents whose value is more than max( kVj (Cj ) 2n
, 1 4n ). Renumber the agents in the following way. Pick an agent from S n−1 (which contains at least one agent) and number it n − 1. Pick an agent from S n−2 (which contains at least one other agent) and number it n−2. Continue this way to number the agents by k = n−1, . . . , 0. Now, the utilitarian welfare of the new division is lower-bounded by:
and the utilitarian welfare ratio is at most:
, 1) Denote the ratio in the right-hand side by NUM DEN . Let a k = V k (C k ), so that NUM = n−1 k=0 a k and DEN = n−1 k=0 max(k · a k , 1). To get an upper bound on U/W , we find a sequence a 0 , . . . , a n−1 that maximizes NUM DEN subject to ∀k : 0 ≤ a k ≤ 1. Observation 1. in a maximizing sequence, a 0 = 1 and there is no k > 0 such that a k < 1/k. Proof : Setting such a k to 1/k increases NUM and does not change DEN.
Observation 2. A maximizing sequence must be weakly-decreasing (for all k < k , a k ≥ a k ). Proof : if there exists k < k such that a k < a k , then we can swap a k with a k . This does not change NUM but strictly decreases DEN.
Observation 3. In a maximizing sequence, there is no k > 0 such that 1/k < a k < 1. Proof (for which we are grateful to Varun Dubey): If 1/k < a k < 1 then for some sufficiently small > 0, both a k + and a k − are in (1/k, 1) and replacing a k with a k ± makes the ratio strictly smaller than the maximum. Replacing a k with a k + makes the ratio NUM+ DEN+k ; this new ratio is smaller than NUM DEN so · DEN < k · NUM. Replacing a k with a k − makes the ratio NUM− DEN−k ; that new ratio is smaller than NUM DEN so − · DEN < −k · NUM. But the two latter inequalities · DEN < k · NUM and − · DEN < −k · NUM are contradictory. Hence, the assumption 1/k < a k < 1 is false. Observations 1-3 imply that a maximizing sequence has a very specific format. It is characterized by an integer l ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} such that, for all k ≤ l, a k = 1 and for all k ≥ l + 1, a k = 1/k. So:
where H n = n k=1 (1/k) is the n-th harmonic number. The number l is integer, but the expression is bounded by the maximum attained when l is allowed to be real. By standard calculus we get that the real value of l which maximizes the above expression is l = 2(n − 1) + (H n + 1)(H n + 2) − (H n + 1) = Θ( √ n). Substituting into the above inequality gives:
as claimed.
6.2. Nash price of partial-proportionality THEOREM 6.2. For every constant B ≥ 4 and for any number n of agents, the Nash price of (1/B)-proportionality with rectangularity constraint is less than 11.2.
The theorem is proved by the following: LEMMA 6.2. Assume that there are n agents whose value functions are normalized such that the value of the entire cake C is 1. Assume that there is a division of C among these n agents such that each agent j ∈ {1, . . . , n} holds a rectangular piece C j , so the Nash welfare U (the geometric mean of the values) is given by
Then, there exists a (1/4)-proportional rectangular allocation of C to these same n agents with Nash welfare W , and U/W < 11.2.
PROOF. Apply the redivision protocol of Section 5 to redivide the existing n pieces among the n agents. Renumber the agents as in the proof Theorem 6.1. Then the Nash welfare of the new division, raised to the n-th power, can be bounded as:
and the ratio of the new welfare to the previous welfare can be bounded as:
The nominator does not depend on the valuations, so the ratio is maximized when the denominator is minimized. This happens when each factor in the product is minimized. The minimal value of the 0-th factor is 1 and the minimal value of the other factors is k. Hence:
where e is the base of the natural logarithm. Taking the n-th root gives U/W < (4e) · n/2π 1/n . A calculation in Wolfram Alpha shows that the rightmost term n/2π 1/n is bounded globally by 1.03, so all in all U/W < 1.03 · 4 · e < 11.2 as claimed.
FUTURE WORK
Two-dimensional division, re-division, and price-of-fairness are three relatively new topics, and there is a lot of room for future research in each of them.
Handling other geometric constraints
Two steps in our redivision algorithm are sensitive to the geometric constraint: the 1dimensional reduction used in Sub. 3.1
Step 5, and the allocation-completion algorithm of Sec. 4. We describe how these steps are affected by several alternative constraints: (a) Convexity in two dimensions. When the cake is convex and the pieces must be convex, the 1-dimensional reduction shown in Sub. 1.4 works as-is, since the preimage of an interval is a convex subset of C. The simple allocation-completion algo-rithm also works as-is. As explained in [Segal-Halevi 2016] , the bound on the number of additional convex pieces changes from m − 2 to 2m − 4. Hence, the partialproportionality guarnatee of our redivision protocol changes from 1/4-proportionality to 1/5-proportionality. The price-of-fairness bounds are true for every B ≥ 5, and the bound on the Nash-price-of-fairness changes from 11.2 to 14.
(b) Convexity in one dimension. If the cake is 1-dimensional and the pieces have to be intervals, the allocation-completion algorithm becomes trivial: just stretch each existing interval to the right/left to fill the unallocated parts. No empty intervals remain, so our redivision protocol immediately becomes 1/3-proportional. The price-offairness bounds are true for every B ≥ 3, and the bound on the Nash-price-of-fairness changes from 11.2 to 8.4.
(c) Convexity in three or more dimensions. The 1-dimensional reduction works as-is when the cake and the pieces are multi-dimensional convex objects. However, we currently do not have an allocation-completion algorithm for convex objects (or even for boxes) in three or more dimensions.
(d) Path-connectivity in two dimensions. If the pieces have to be path-connected but not necessarily convex, then the allocation-completion step is much easier and no holes are created [Segal-Halevi 2016] . Hence m = m. However, the 1-dimensional reduction step is more complicated. The simple vertical projection shown in Sub. 1.4 does not work because, when the cake is not convex, the pre-image of an interval is not necessarily connected. In some cases it may be possible to find a different function that does preserve connectivity, for example, when C is open and simply-connected [Justpassingby 2016 ]. The algorithmic aspects require some more work.
(e) Fatness. A fat object is an object with a bounded length/width ratio, such as a square. Fatness makes sense in land division: if you are entitled to a 900 square meters of land, you will probably prefer to get them as a 30 × 30 square or a 45 × 20 rectangle rather than 9000 × 0.1 sliver. A division problem with fatness requirement cannot be reduced to one-dimensional division. In previous papers [Segal-Halevi et al. 2015a,b] we developed some specialized division protocols that support fatness constraints, and they can be used instead of the 1-dimensional reduction. However, we do not have an allocation-completion algorithm with fatness constraints.
Improving the constants
Our redivision protocol is 1/4-proportional (for a rectangular cake) and the constant 4 enters into the price-of-fairness bounds. This "4" comes from several factors that can potentially be improved.
(a) In the redivision protocol of Section 5, we add m virtual agents, so that the total number of agents is n + m. However, in the final step each old agent chooses either its virtual or its normal agent, while the other agent is "wasted". If we could know the m choices of the agents in advance, we could employ only n agents overall and this would subtract 1 from the constant (from 1/4 to 1/3). One way to analyze this scenario is to define a strategic game in which each old agent has two possible strategies: "normal" vs. "virtual". A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in this game corresponds to an allocation satisfying the partial-retention requirement. We conjecture that a purestrategy Nash equilibrium indeed exists. While finding a Nash equilibrium is usually a computationally-hard problem, it may be useful as an existential result and improve the constants in the price-of-fairness theorems.
(b) As shown by Example 3.2, as long as we treat each existing piece C j as an "island" and insist that each new piece be entirely contained in an existing piece (i.e, we do not cross the existing division lines), the resulting division can only be partiallyproportional and not fully proportional. It may be possible to improve the proportional-ity guarantees by devising a different redivision procedure that does cross the existing division lines, but this may require new geometric techniques.
Price-of-fairness
There is a lower bound of Ω( √ n) on the utilitarian price of proportionality with arbitrary pieces [Caragiannis et al. 2012] . The example used in their lower bound can be easily modified to prove a similar bound on the price of proportionality with rectangular pieces. However, we could not generalize it to the price of partial proportionality, and it is interesting to know which of the following two options is correct: (a) there is a lower bound of Ω( √ n) matching our Theorem 6.1, or (b) the actual price of partialproportionality is o( √ n). The latter option would imply that partial-proportionality is asymptotically "cheaper" than full proportionality, in social welfare terms.
